Beneficial constraints: beneficial for whom?

Abstract

Wolfgang Streeck convincingly argues, in an influential paperpublished in 1997, that economic performance in market societiesis enhanced when the rational, voluntaristic choices of actorsare constrained by a variety of normative and institutionalconstraints. This paper offers three modifications of this centralDurkheimian thesis: (1) the meaning of "good performance" ofan economic system differs among class actors in a market economy;(2) the level of institutional constraint that is optimal for"good economic performance" in the interests of capitalistsis generally lower than the level of constraints that is optimalfor workers; and (3) institutional constraints on voluntaryrational choice - even those optimal for capitalists - alsomay have dynamic effects on the balance of power among socialforces which could lead capitalists to prefer suboptimal constraintsfrom the point of view of "economic performance".