Informal contracting between and within firms

Autores/as

  • Ricard Gil Johns Hopkins Carey Business School
  • Giorgio Zanarone Colegio Universitario Estudios Financieros

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009

Palabras clave:

Informal contracts, Enforcement, Empirical evidence, Testability

Resumen

While informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis.

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Publicado

2017-12-01

Número

Sección

Gestão Tecnológica

Cómo citar

Informal contracting between and within firms. (2017). Revista De Administração, 52(4), 492-496. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009