Informal contracting between and within firms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009Palavras-chave:
Informal contracts, Enforcement, Empirical evidence, TestabilityResumo
While informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis.Downloads
Os dados de download ainda não estão disponíveis.
Downloads
Publicado
2017-12-01
Edição
Seção
Gestão Tecnológica
Como Citar
Informal contracting between and within firms. (2017). Revista De Administração, 52(4), 492-496. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009