From the standard of taste in Hume: criticism and rationality

Abstract

Hume shows, in the "Of the standard of taste" essay, how, despite the diversity inherent to taste, it is possible to establish an universal standard in thís matter, standing not on the object, but in human nature itself. He also poínts, however, that the finding of this standard is a result of experience, particularly, of that related to the practice of aesthetic criticism. He seems to establísh, therefore, the refinement as an essential item not only of the discovery of the standard of taste, but also as a component in the constitution of this standard. Our intention is, in this context, to investigate the role, in humean philosophy, of regulation in the processof establishing an universal principie for taste, as wellas pointing to, at last, some consequences of this subject to the analysis of the possibility of establishing a standard of rationality in a philosophy that separates experimental reason from demonstrative reason.