Leibniz: The affirmation of freedom as contingent determination
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v0i2p05-18Keywords:
Individual substance, Freedom, Necessity, ContingencyAbstract
The text considers the so called opposition between the affirmation of the human freedom, based on the principle of the spontaneousness of the substances, and the leibnizian definition of individual substance given in logical terms, i.e., a subject whose notion comprehends all predicates in an explicit or implicit way.Downloads
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