Kant, History and the Idea of Moral Development

Abstract

Kant’s philosophy of history has been criticized as incompatible with central tenets of his moral theory. To many commentators, the very idea of moral development has seemed inconsistent with some or all of the following basic Kantian tenets. First, his notion of rational development has been said to be incompatible with his claim that the moral law is unconditionally and hence universally valid (the universal validity problem). Second, his notion of rational development, especially the notion of ‘moralization’, seems to run counter to his thesis that moral agency is noumenal and hence atemporal (the atemporality problem). Finally, the notion of moral progress seems to contradict the dignity and moral equality of all humans by declaring some ‘freer’ than others (the moral equality problem). In this paper, I argue that the charges of inconsistency stem largely from an insufficient understanding of Kant’s model of
rational development. Taking the universal validity problem
as a point of departure, I start by examining what the ‘predispositions for the use of reason’ consist in and how Kant thinks they develop over the course of history. I then explain how this account allows us to solve the two other problems. I end with a discussion of Kant’s reasons for assuming that there is historical progress.