Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice

Authors

  • Axel Honneth Universidade de Frankfurt
  • Joel Anderson Universidade de Utrecht

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v0i17p81-112

Abstract

In this paper, we develop an account of what it would mean for a society to take seriously the obligation to reduce individuals’ autonomy-related vulnerabilities to an acceptable minimum. In particular, we argue that standard liberal accounts underestimate the scope of this obligation because they fail to appreciate various threats to autonomy. The alternative account of autonomy we sketch here highlights the ways in which individuals’ autonomy can be diminished or impaired through damage to the social relations that support autonomy. By articulating a conception of autonomy in terms of, more specifically, a theory of mutual recognition, we aim to pinpoint the individualistic bias in liberal accounts and the concomitant underestimation of our dependence on relationships of respect, care, and esteem. We conclude by anticipating some broader implications of this for how proceduralist accounts of social justice ought to be revised.

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Author Biographies

  • Axel Honneth, Universidade de Frankfurt

    Professor de Filosofia da Universidade de Frankfurt

  • Joel Anderson, Universidade de Utrecht
    Pesquisador do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Utrecht

Published

2011-06-14

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Honneth, A., & Anderson, J. (2011). Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice. Cadernos De Filosofia Alemã: Crítica E Modernidade, 17, 81-112. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v0i17p81-112