Leilões de objetos idênticos com demanda unitária: resultados introdutórios
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/1413-8050/ea218838Keywords:
auctions ofidentical objects, single-unit demandsAbstract
This is an introduction to the auction theory ofidentical objects and single-unit demands. The objects are sold simultaneously or sequencially. Under the hypothesis of independent private values, we characterize the symmetric equilibria and prove a payoff equivalence theorem.
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