Filosofia das ciências sociais: temas atuais
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-20702014000200002Resumo
A filosofia das ciências sociais, concebida da maneira adequada, tem algo a oferecer aos que praticam as ciências sociais. Os cientistas sociais adotam em suas pesquisas, ainda que de forma implícita, alguma filosofia de sua ciência. Para evitar impasses, é melhor explicitar essa filosofia e ser criticamente consciente dos seus méritos. A filosofia das ciências sociais, por sua vez, não pode ser praticada sem um envolvimento íntimo com a pesquisa social. O artigo esboça alguns desenvolvimentos da filosofia da ciência pós-positivista e suas implicações para a filosofia das ciências sociais. Essa perspectiva geral é então aplicada a alguns debates das ciências sociais: a natureza da causalidade; o lugar dos mecanismos na pesquisa social e da legitimidade de explicações puramente macrossociológicas; a distinção entre pesquisa qualitativa e quantitativa; a distinção entre evidência observacional e evidência experimental; a polêmica entre o individualismo e o holismo metodológicos na explicação sociológica.
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