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Sedimented, Hybrid and Multiple? The New Cultural Geography of Identities

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Abstract

This paper explores the sedimentation of multiple levels of media use and identity as a key element of the changing cultural geography of globalization. In this paper, we examine the relationship between processes of hybridization of identity and culture over time and the sedimentation or buildup, maintenance, and defense of multilayered identities.

Keywords: multiple levels, identity, hybridization

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INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the sedimentation of multiple levels of media use and identity as a key element of the changing cultural geography of globalization. The movement from traditional local life to modern interaction with mass media already produced identities that were multilayered with cultural geographic elements that are local, regional, transnational based on enduring cultural-linguistic regions, and national (Anderson, 1983). Both traditional and new media users around the world continue to strongly reflect these "modern" layers or aspects of identity while many also acquire new layers of identity that are transnational, or in some specific circumstances, global.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between processes of hybridization of identity and culture over time and the sedimentation or buildup, maintenance, and defense of multilayered identities. These increasingly multilayered identities are articulated with a variety of changing structures (Hall 1997). Economies, political powers, social class and geography strongly structure who can access what new channels. Media institutions themselves are becoming more complexly multilayered as they reach further geographically. Institutional models, such as commercial TV networks, globalize, but are also localized and regionalized as they engage the specific histories and institutions of a variety of cultures, media traditions and regulatory systems. Identities also layer up as people migrate, acculturate to new cultures, live abroad, travel, learn languages, join or leave religions, and, although the experiences are less directly personal and less intense, perhaps as they acquire access to new forms of media.

These kinds of adaptations and localizations point us toward another notable theoretical strand, hybridity. In this emerging model, hybridity and multi-layeredness coexist and interact. Layers like the institutions, program genres, and audience identities for public service, like the BBC, or government-sponsored media, like Telesur, co-exist with layers for commercial networks, genres and audiences. All these can acquire and maintain what seems to individuals like substantial solidity, but all are also changing, in part as they interact with and change each other.

CULTURAL SEDIMENTATION:

LAYERS AND MIXTURES/HYBRIDS

In my own work, particularly in a number of in-depth interviews in Brazil and in Texas, from Austin to the Texas border with Mexico, I find a process of hybridity as well as a process

of the formation, maintenance, occasional collapse, and recent proliferation of multiple layers of identity and corresponding layers of media use. I articulate this as a dual process. As an observer in Brazil or Texas, for instance, I can perceive cultural hybridity taking place in a variety of situations and (sub)cultures. However, I rarely interview people who see themselves as culturally hybrid. I do, however, frequently find myself interviewing people who articulate their identity as connected to a series of geographic spaces or cultural or social layers. In both Brazil and Texas, I find people who articulate very clearly a local sense of self, a regional sense of self, a national sense of self, some interest or knowledge of the global, a social class sense of self, a religious sense of self, an ethnic and/or linguistic sense of self, a professional, and an educational sense of self.

So in my work, I am moving toward what we might see as a kind of sedimentary model in which layers of meaning, culture, identity, and media use form, overlay and persist. New layers form over the top of all others as structural circumstances permit or even dictate. Sometimes when we look at people, for instance, we are likely to see the newest layer as strongest. When many observers when they look at a culture these days, they see on top a new layer of what they might call globalization. So seeing this as a new and highly visible layer, they might suppose that this is perhaps now the dominant layer, perhaps homogenizing all the others. Or perhaps even the dominant aspect of someone's identity or experience.

Part of this depends on our own starting point. I remember an instructive dialogue with a former colleague from India, Bella Mody, where we realized that, as someone from India, she tended to see recent layers of globalization as striking, even threatening. However, for me, especially when I had first lived in Brazil in the 1970s, I saw the Americanized elements there as unexceptional, since they were what I was used to, but was surprised by how much national continuity and difference I saw.

However, if we were looking at a highway cut or a river canyon someplace, we would see the layers from the side. We realize that there are recent layers, which are important, but they've built up over older layers, which also remain important. We would see that layers break down and blend, as well as persist. One problem with the geological analogy for this is that it seems to imply that the layers persist as separate. But as in geology, the layers often interact.

They sometimes break down and form new layers out of the pre-existing ones. Varan (1998, p. 58) used a geological metaphor to argue the reverse, that global or transcultural contact, tends to erode local cultures:

Through paradigmatic application of geological constructs, I demonstrate the utility of applying the erosion metaphor to questions related to the transcultural impact of television. I explore four specific processes associated with such erosion: cultural abrasion, resulting from friction between the contrasting values reflected in a cultural terrain and a foreign media agent; cultural deflation, whereby least consolidated facets within a culture are most vulnerable to foreign influence; cultural deposition, in which foreign beliefs, practices, and artifacts supplement a cultural landscape potentially providing for cross-cultural fertilization; and cultural saltation, where social practices may appropriate communication systems in response to the perceived threat of a foreign media agent. The metaphor provides a framework to reinterpret earlier findings and to contextualize experiences of cultures under threat.

Even more in culture, we think we will see that these layers interact with each other so that as one becomes globalized a certain part of one's life, such as one's education or profession, one finds that inevitably in dialogue with one's local interests, musical preferences, or even religious or philosophical interests. One could have a rich metaphor to work with for the ongoing nature of change. Too many systems either overstate change, as in the very strong cultural imperialism hypothesis, which anticipates strong homogenization from outside cultures, or in contrast, understate change, as in some globalization hypotheses in which everything forms separate pockets and simply persists. I don't think any of those are quite adequate for understanding the complexity of what we see as people do use new forms of media to interact, forming new layers and levels of identity. But they continue also to think in terms of older layers of identity, interest and media use, as well.

ARTICULATION OF NEW SPACES AND LAYERS OF IDENTITY

Hall observes that "the great collective social identities, which we thought of as large-scale, all-encompassing, homogenous, as unified collective identities..." (Hall 1997, p. 44), such as class, race, nation, gender and "the West," are still present and efficacious, but are no longer complete master concepts.

He sees such collective identities now as more processes of identification, never completed, related to evolving perceptions of difference between groups. He cited the example of how many young people wanted to be Caribbean, Black and British, not just one or the other (1997). Hall's recognition of the increasing multiplicity of identities and identifications is one of the bases of our argument about multiple levels and spaces of identity.

Hall also argued that identities did not grow or flow freely, that they were articulated to texts, to institutions and to societal structures of economic, social and political power. While identities change, multiply and have relative autonomy, they are also tied to sources of power, to economic structures and class positions, to producers of media (Hall 1980), but not in simple or reductionist ways. I would like to build on this idea to see how different levels of identity are articulated to changes in media access structured by class, to cultural capital that guides and limits choices and understandings among media offerings, and to other forces that can be seen as articulated themselves through complex cultural geographies.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY

Building on de Certeau, I argue that a cultural geography, like a city, or in our case here, a complex cultural geography of identit(ies), is constructed both from above and below. De Certeau notes that political leaders, planners, industrialists, and others make many strategic decisions top-down. They create a variety of spaces, from the rural areas filled with sugar plantations originally worked by slaves (a political-economic decision that still defines much of the Caribbean and the Northeast coast of Brazil) to cities organized for commerce, finance or industry. However, those who live in and use these spaces make tactical decisions on the ground that can, to some degree, redefine them by what the place's users do with the space, what practices they evolve (de Certeau 1984). For example, I lived in 1977-78 in Brasília. The city had been designed in a severely abstract way with ministries here, housing there, and major commerce elsewhere, but in those two years, I could see that people on the ground were constantly adding bars, coffee shops, music clubs and other cultural amenities to neighborhoods that re-asserted traditional Brazilian urban cultural practices and made it feel more like other Brazilian cities, re-articulating the cultural life of the city. In doing so, they, along with the city planners, created a sense of what the local identity of Brasília is to those who live there.

The same is true of other kinds of order imposed from above. Spanish and Portuguese colonizers imposed Catholicism on indigenous and African peoples in Latin America, but the result was a variety of hybrid practices, not a consistent European religion, De Certeau notes:

Submissive, and even consenting to their subjection, the Indians nevertheless often *made of* {emphasis in the original} the rituals, representations, and laws imposed on them something quite different from what their conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but by using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system they had no choice but to accept. (de Certeau 1984, p. xiii)

This specific phenomenon, religious practice in the Americas, has been a major focus on theorization. Many see the religious syncretism that developed over time in such as practices as one of the first major forms of hybridity (Canclini 1995). For years, many scholars saw the Afro-Brazilian religion *candomblé* as a primary example of syncretism, mixing the *orixás* or spirits of Africa's Yoruba religion and Catholic saints, producing a new hybrid religion (Bastide, 1978). However, one of the principal *candomblé* communities in Salvador, Brazil, *Ilê Axé Opô Afonjá*, issued a statement that said, "Iansã (a *candomblé* deity) is not Saint Barbara" (the Catholic saint with whom Iansã had often been syncretized) (Afonjá 1999). The group argued that syncretism was, in effect, a protective covering or layer designed to conceal the ongoing worship of their African-based religion and avoid persecution, but that today, the pretense of syncretism could be dropped in favor of a deliberate effort to return to the Yoruba roots of *candomblé*. Layers, or overlays of adopted culture can coexist with an inner layer of traditional culture, with the adopted exterior masking the traditional core.

MULTIPLE IDENTIFICATIONS AND MULTIPLE MEDIA SPACES OF PRODUCTION, FLOW, IDENTIFICATION

In this emerging model, people increasingly identify with multiple cultures at various layers or spaces. People identify with multiple cultural groups or symbols in different fields of activity (Bourdieu, 1984). People establish different identities at school and work, in sports or religion, with family and friends. In the process of learning from others, people form multiple layers of cultural capital, often specific not only to a field of activity, as Bourdieu (1984) predicted, but to

different cultural layers. So a person might have both cultural capital they have learned and a specific layer of identity they have developed related to family, neighborhood, religion, school, sports, or even a hobby. People form different dispositions to behave differently with various groups. Someone can be religious and traditional at home with their parents, adventurous and critical with some friends, sports-minded with others, and achievement-oriented with colleagues at work.

All of these different layers of identity and culture will have varied connections to global, cultural linguistic, national, and local spaces and forces. A U.S. soccer fan might begin to identify with European or Latin American teams and might seek out global soccer content on the Internet or watch transnational soccer channels on satellite or cable TV.

These different layers of identity and culture are based in varying combinations of cultural geography, institutional strategies and alliances, and cultural productions based on genre linked to institutions, nations and other cultural spaces. Complex cultural geography is defined from above (de Certeau 1984) by corporate perceptions of and strategies for exploiting cultural definitions of markets and spaces for production, flow and consumption. Institutional power is defined by geography, but also redefines cultural geography, like many new nations with borders arbitrarily defined by previous colonizers, offering new cultural products, such as "national" radio and television, to identify with. Indeed, leaders in most developing countries saw trying to create national identity through broadcasting as one of its first, primary missions (Katz and Wedell 1976).

But cultural markets are also defined from below by the evolving identities and media choices made and enacted daily by millions of individuals reflecting on their lives and making media and cultural choices. In this way, the evolving multi-layered structure of cultural industries corresponding to the multi-layered identities of their consumers and users is enacted both by professionals working on content targeted to identities from above and consumers and users enacting those identities and viewing interests daily from below, rather like the view of structuration by Giddens (1984), in which social structures, however seemingly solid, are enacted and reproduced, sometimes changed, by the actions of all those involved in them.

This paper focuses on the lived experience of audiences with various levels and forms of world television. In particular, it focuses on their identities and how they seem to be forming

multiple identities that correspond in many ways to the multi-layered cultural geography of television in the world. This seems to be due in part to the fact that many of those levels of experience with cultural geography are broadly experienced by almost everyone in the television audience. Everyone has experience of his or her city or locality, which is increasingly addressed directly by local television production in many large cities or provinces. Although some people live isolated from any experience of nationality, the large majority of people seem to be touched by national television as well as nationally defined schooling, newspapers, books, radio, government political campaigns, etc. That is clear in the Brazilian interviews reported below.

The other central argument of this chapter is that while one may refer to identity for many people as increasingly hybrid, it is perhaps more clearly seen as multi-leveled. In fact the two ideas are complementary. Hybridity is a long-term process in which all identities are constantly changing (Pieterse 2004), but we argue here that most people experience identity as regards media in part as a series of cultural geographic levels from local to global. They also experience it, depending on the place and group, as related to language, culture, ethnicity, and religion. Plus, identities and media uses are divided still further by ethnicity and gender. So the idea of levels of identity, per se, is a heuristic device for understanding the way that people seem to experience identity, particularly in relation to the complexity of world television.

Based on our review of the literature as well as fieldwork in Texas and Brazil, we find that people make sense of media first through a set of cultural identities based on space and place: local, regional, national, transnational and global. Very related are identities based on culture and language, which tend to be linked to space and place, but can be transnational across widely separated places. Examples are transnational, post-colonial audiences, like Francophone, Anglophone or Lusophone, or the cases of migrants or diasporic communities. All these identities can define television viewing. They can be maintained and recreated even after people have moved away from the place where the cultural linguistic identity was first formed (Appadurai 1996).

The next level for most I interviewed seems to be one of social class, based on the idea of cultural capital, linked to experiences within the family, school, neighborhood and social

groups, shaped by economic class commonalities (Bourdieu 1984) and a sense of group experience that solidifies into a class habitus (Bourdieu 1984). Whether they are actively aware of it or not, most people also experience and interpret media through a sense of ethnicity or race, as it is culturally constructed in the place and time where they live. This evaluation requires more inference by the researcher, though, since I found many people unable or unwilling to articulate a sense of race, as we will see below.

Almost all people similarly experience media through an awareness of themselves and their identity in terms of gender. In some countries, people also tend to have a very distinct sense of identity related to their age group. In the U.S., for example, media use and understanding are heavily segmented by age group, whereas that might not be as true of other societies in which the media segment themselves less by appeals to age groups. In Brazil, upper class youth are likely to have media uses very different from their parents but working class youth are less likely to show such large differences, (as reflected in interviews by the author.) Finally, almost everyone experiences media refracted through a sense of values shared with a community, which is often expressed in terms of religious group identification, but relates to other communities of values as well.

Depending on the circumstances of the individual and the groups they are associated with, different levels of identity might be primary for experiencing and making sense of television and other media. For some, class identity might seem primary, as in some of the studies of the British working class (Morley 1992). For others, as in studies related to the reaction to some Hollywood productions by audiences in the Islamic Middle East, religion or national heritage might be a primary identity for interpreting media experiences (Chambers 2002). For others, a primary identity for interpreting media might be ethnicity or gender, or both. For example, U.S. Latinas tend to view imported Mexican television in terms of their own experiences of class, gender and ethnicity within the Latino minority in the U.S. (Rojas 2001). However, a full examination of all these possible layers of identity is a large project, so the paper focuses more precisely on how people interviewed in Brazil are engaging television in relation to emerging layers of identity that correspond to a sense of cultural geography: global, regional, national, provincial or state-level, and city or local.

I will organize the rest of the paper in terms of aspects or layers of identity. In part, this corresponds to theoretical concerns. In greater part, it reflects the way that people expressed their identities to us in interviews that provide the empirical base for the rest of the chapter. The interviews come from Brazil and central Texas. In the case of Brazil, students and I conducted

fieldwork in the city of São Paulo, and areas in and around Salvador, Bahia and Ilheus, Bahia, in 1989-90 and the summers of 1991-1998, continuing in Salvador in 2003-2005. In Texas, students and I conducted interviews, primarily with Latinos, but also Anglos and African-Americans in East Austin, Texas, in 1999-2005, 2009 and in South Texas 2004-2008. In 2004-2005, and 2009, that interviewing focused on Mexican migrants to the USA.²

In the following sections, we will discuss space and place as anchoring points for both flow of media, media consumption and cultural identity. This layer emerged as primary in both our Brazilian interviews and our U.S. Latino interviews, although they differed in whether the spatial focus of identity was domestic or transnational. Sense of identity linked to space also articulate other identities. For example, in Brazil a sense of place becomes way to talk about race, informants in Salvador would discuss differences from other parts and peoples of Brazil by talking about being “Baiano” (Bahian) rather than being “Black” but I often got the distinct feeling that they were talking about being “Black,” too, using a less charged vocabulary.

MAPPING THE LAYERS OF GLOBAL CULTURAL STRUCTURING AND IDENTIFICATION

This section introduces a map, or typology, of layers of global cultural structuring and identification from the most global down to the local. Some of this map comes from examining the production process, some from extensive mapping students and I have done of television flows (Straubhaar, 2007), and much comes from interviews with a variety of audience members in Brazil and in Texas. Both semi-structured interviews about media and less structured life and family histories with media were gathered. Rantanen (2005) provides very engaging example of how carefully examined family histories of media use may inform analyses of globalization. We also very consciously built on the interviewing approach of the FOCYP project in Mexico by González and colleagues (1986), Following is a map, or typology of layers from the most global down to the local.

² The 2005 study was conducted under the supervision of Joseph Straubhaar, Viviana Rojas, Jeremiah Spence, Martha Fuentes, and Juan Pinon. It looked at family trajectories (Occupation, education, migration) (Gonzalez, 2001; Mass, 2003), personal histories (in-depth interviews and genograms), family histories, assessment of media uses by generations, using surveys and semi-structured interview. Interviews were conducted by 43 graduate and undergraduate students in two seminars.

The sample was a convenience sample: families living in poor, working class and middle class neighborhoods of Austin (for at least 3 years). There were a total of 34 informants: Latinos (24) and Anglos (10). We collected 18 individual life histories, and another 16 from members of 5 multi-generation families (3 Latino and 2 Anglo families). There were 22 females and 12 males. In terms of age, there were eight over 50 (Grandparents), 14 from 30 to 50 (Parents), and 12 from 18 to 29 (Children).

Figure 1. Typology of Layers of Global Cultural Structuring and Identification

Structures	Identification
Most Global	
Global infrastructures of technology, finance and media models	Cosmopolitan individuals/groups who see selves as global or transnational (Hannerz, Rantanen)
U.S. “empire” based on Hollywood structural & cultural power	US popular culture common second layer of identification (Gitlin)
Other nation-based global exporters –Japanese anime, Bollywood, etc	Audience interest in thematic proximity and/or exoticism (LaPastina and Straubhaar)
Global format producers and exporters/co-producers, such as Endemol	"National" adaptation of global ideas to appeal to national audience desire for cultural proximity
Global genre producers and co-producers, like Discovery or BBC, in documentaries	Desire for information/cultural capital plus entertainment
Transnational, NOT global in scope	
Transnational cultural-linguistic producers, markets and audiences – Anglophone, French	Common colonial language and history, diasporic migrants' experience, cultural proximity
Geo-cultural regional producers, markets and audiences- -Arabic, Spanish Latin America	Shared or similar languages, shared histories, geographic proximity (Sinclair, Wilkinson)
Translocal producers, markets and audiences, targeting U.S. Latinos from Mexico, for ex.	Desire by migrants, diasporic populations for "home" languages, cultures
National, regional or local	
National (where most TV still watched?)	Cultural proximity for national languages, cultures (Straubhaar)
Regional institutions within or across national borders	Cultural proximity for regional, local languages and cultures (Kumar, Iwabuchi)
Metropolitan or media capital-based institutions, serving city, national and transnational/global	Cultural proximity for national, regional, local languages and cultures (Curtin)
City or neighborhood based institutions	Cultural proximity for regional, local languages and cultures

Based on life history with media interviews in Salvador and São Paulo, Brazil 1989-2006 and Central/South Texas, 1998-2009.

Examining this list of layered producers, markets or cultural spaces and audiences' identifications more carefully, there are historical and cultural geographic patterns of development that put global developments into a more nuanced perspective. Markets and services are not just newly defined from above by technology or corporate ambition, but also gradually defined from below by culture-patterned uses and identities that layer over time, including many pre-global or even pre-modern layers of culture, which are often the most powerful layers of identity.

LOCAL IDENTITIES

The dominant cultural forces and identities for most people seem to have been originally local and regional. People thought of themselves primarily in terms of villages, local dialects, perhaps tribes or clans. Only after 1700 did most Frenchmen speak French, in one of the earliest nations to be defined as such (Weber 1976). That sense of locality lingers. For many people, village, tribe or clan is what they think of first, in terms of identity, as would be national builders, like the USA in Afghanistan, often seem to discover.

Many cultural theory works use the term "local" in a loose way as opposed to global. It would help to define local more precisely. Here we look at local identity in a fairly specific way, as one layer among several, perhaps not primary but often very important. Based on my interviews in Brazil, even the most globe-hopping businessman or academic usually still also has a very *local identity* based in the specific cultural geography of a neighborhood they live in, other neighborhoods they go to for work or pleasure. That locality may be defined by planners on maps but is often more vividly defined by local media like newspapers or radio, restaurants, music clubs and scenes, nightclubs, museums, bookstores, and coffee shops; all the many places that in a very physical and spatial sense tend to give life local context and local pleasure. These are linked to personal networks and sometimes language differences, but in media terms, also local music scenes, local radio, local newspapers, festivals, and performances. Furthermore, their interpretive community, with which they share enjoyment and interpretation of media (Lindlof, Shatzer et al. 1988) is based in a family, local friends, neighbors, clubs, church congregations, sports groups, etc.

The experience of locality is bound up with other layers of identity, such as ethnicity or language/culture. For example, Rosemary Alexander Isett found that Inuit interviewees in Alaska felt considerable distance from the culture of the lower 48 U.S. states as portrayed on television. In fact, watching U.S. culture on television, they tended to be relieved that they lived in a rural area within their own ethnic culture (Isett 1995). Latinos interviewed in Central and South Texas also tended to think in terms of their identities in terms of very local conditions, particularly neighborhoods and extended families. Like the Inuit, they often felt considerable cultural distance from the dominant U.S., both in terms of language and culture. However, this sense of cultural distance varies greatly between generations, which will be discussed more below, and families. In fact, our fieldwork with Latinos has brought in the layer of family

identity very powerfully. Family with Latinos often roots one in a specific neighborhood, but can also connect oneself to extended family back in Mexico as well. So while family is often bound up with locality, it is different with migrants, particularly those who see themselves as part of a temporary diaspora, with plans to permanently, or cyclically return to what one considers a cultural homeland, such as Mexico or Central America.

However, complete cultural unity at the local level (if it ever existed) has been broken by distanciation (Giddens, 1990). As that concept implies, local people begin to identify at a distance with non-local cultural trends and peoples through media, schooling, travel, work, migration, and the vicarious experience of others in their personal networks. However, this is less new than many theorists of globalization suppose. Almost all cultures have been in relatively constant contact with others and hybridization between cultures has been more the norm than not (Pieterse, 2002). A more interesting question for us here might be how much various forms of media have accelerated the relative weight and pace of distanciation, change and hybridization. We want to give weight to the relative solidity of the local, as many if not most people experience it, without falling into what Pieterse calls “the reification of the local, sidelining the interaction between the local and the global” (2002:47).

SUB-NATIONAL REGIONAL LAYERS OF IDENTITY

Well before the nation-state achieved relative primacy in institutional definitions of identity, local cultures generally had cultural exchange and interpenetration with larger cultural linguistic regions. Local groups were part of larger language, culture and ethnic groups, like the Inca, which had trade, ties and affiliations with many smaller, distinct groups across much of what is now Peru, Bolivia and Chile, or the Mayan cultures which sprawled across what is now southern Mexico and Guatemala. These pre-national cultures continue much of what is local or sub-national in many parts of the world. Even local cultures whose languages have been extinguished usually leave behind traces in food, agriculture, names, and ethnic physical characteristics that continue to structure the cultural locality. This is the *longue durée*, or long-term process, of hybridity, as discussed in Pieterse (2002:91). In this view, hybridity is an extremely old, long run process, into which (post)modern media fall.

In larger nations like Brazil, India and China, or even medium sized nations like Mozambique, there are usually coherent sub-national *regional layers of identities* that reflect these enduring, hybrid forms of identity. In many places those conform to the cultural contours

of pre-European/colonial cultures. As we shall see below, in the case of Brazil, these local and (sub-national) regional cultures tend to maintain a sense of difference from national cultures that mediates their use of national media (Martín-Barbero 1993). The experience of local/regional identities in Brazil subsumes or even conflates ethnic differences, as different regions of the country have very different ethnic mixes, which support regional cultural industries, particularly in music, in the South (Leal 1989), North (McGowan and Pessanha 1998) and Northeast (Vianna 1999).

Many of these (sub-national) regional foci depend on language variation. Very important cultural and linguistic regions from the Kurds in Turkey to Mayan language speakers in southern Mexico to a variety of regional language groups in India still have strong layers of quite separate identities from the nation states that contain them. They also often have ethnic, cultural, and religious differences with national majority populations. They usually have their own music traditions and scenes (O'Connor 2002), and histories, which are often intense focuses of identification. Sometimes hundreds of millions in very large nations like India speak local or regional languages linked to regional cultures, film industries, broadcasters, etc., which may rival the importance of national media in some respects (Kumar 2006).

So regionalism varies with its bases of language, religion, ethnicity and musical tradition in different countries, but is very widespread. For example, many people, including those I interviewed in Salvador, Brazil, revealed regionalism as a distinct layer of identity in their media and cultural choices. Indeed, Salvador residents would usually identify local music like *Samba-reggae* or *Axé* as local, with other musics, often linked to holidays, like *Forró*, danced during the *Sao João* holiday, as regional--shared across the North and Northeast of Brazil. In fact, this regional music, *forró*, has traveled with Northeastern migrants to more prosperous South and Southeastern Brazil, giving migrants a means of maintaining regional identity, or at least nostalgia for it.

GEO-CULTURAL LAYERS OF IDENTITY OR SPACES

Another strong set of pre-national and pre-global cultural forces are *geo-cultural*, often based on cultural-linguistic groups that precede the European colonization beginning in the late 1400s. They tend to have strong geographic regional proximity, hence the geo-, that turned into lasting close cultural ties. These are based on older ethnic groups, languages, empires, and religions, in

places like Greater China, the Arab World, and South Asia. Some other pre-national cultural forces and identities that remain very powerful date from European colonial empires, migration, languages, religions, and racial mixtures, in Latin America and elsewhere. Post-colonial areas like Latin America now share centuries of historical, cultural linguistic, ethnic, dynastic or political, and religious roots, of geo-linguistic (Sinclair 1999) or geo-cultural layers of understanding and identification (Straubhaar 2005).

They were reinforced by the media of the time. Books have flowed among language and religious groups for millennia. The Bible and Koran helped expand large areas of shared religious identification and at least in the case of the Koran, considerable Arabic language hegemony as well in the Mid-East and North Africa. Music, drama, poetry and other "media," broadly defined helped reinforce such ties, even before printed books.

CULTURAL LINGUISTIC TRANSNATIONAL LAYERS OF IDENTITY OR SPACES

There can also be meaningful associations widely spread geographically but linked by language, culture and history, colonial experience, and now media and academic interaction that build on common literatures, administrative traditions, literary, dramatic and poetic forms, etc. There are geographically far-flung groupings such as the Portuguese-speaking world (Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, and Brazil, along with much smaller places like East Timor) or the English-speaking world, the USA, and other Anglophone nations, such as Australia or Canada (Abram 2004). I propose to distinguish them from the geo-cultural by calling them *cultural linguistic transnational layers of identity or spaces*.

Former French colonies still both import from France and produce for themselves in French, creating a geographically dispersed transnational culture of *francophonie*, which supports film, television and music production in a number of places, from Quebec to Senegal. Similarly, former Portuguese colonies are linked in a Lusophone culture, or *Lusofonia*, which centers on both Brazil and Portugal-- mostly Brazil in terms of television, film and music production-- but extends to East Timor and a number of African countries. Former British colonies are similarly linked, and like the Lusophone cultures, television production is dominated not by the former colonial power, but by a larger former colony, the United States. For these audiences, as well as those who speak Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Persian, Turkish, etc.,

their populations have migrated globally enough to create diasporic groups that constitute large, commercially attractive transnational audiences.

While the roots of these geo-cultural and transitional cultural linguistic layers of culture predated both the nation-state and globalization, they were reinforced by many of the new forces, particularly in technology and economics that we associate with globalization. Just as we see growth in Hollywood coverage of the world (Miller, Govil et al. 2005), we see rapid growth in cultural linguistic and geo-cultural spaces and markets in television exports (Straubhaar 2007), satellite/cable TV (Sinclair, Jacka et al. 1996), Internet sites (Mallapragada 2006), music (Perrone and Dunn 2002) and movie downloads (Kavoori and Punathambekar 2008).

NATIONAL MEDIA SPACES AND IDENTITIES

However, national power over media still remains strong in most of the world, at least where strong, coherent governments persist (Morris and Waisbord 2001). Many people in the last two centuries have interacted with modern national educational systems in which textbooks and teaching norms are discussed and prescribed at a national level. They have also grown up with national media. They often deal with other nationalizing forces, national churches in some cases, national labor unions, national sport teams, institution-led patriotism, and all the things that in many ways are articulated with a certain sense of nationalism.

National cultural forces are linked to novels and national newspapers since the 19th Century (Anderson, 1983), and since the 20th Century, national radio, television, film and music. Anderson shows those national cultures and national media are not a given and they are slowly and often carefully constructed over time. Sometimes governments have deliberately used cultural elements, such as the 1930s to present use of samba and other music in Brazil, to articulate national identity (Vianna 1999).

In most places with relatively coherent, relatively powerful nation-states, people to come to have a layer of identity which reflects an imagined national identity, as proposed by Anderson (1983). Historically that process was experienced as beginning with the incursion of national political institutions, such as the army, tax-collectors, and governors into local places and cultures, but in many places those institutions left a relatively light footprint on a still largely local sense of identity. Urban elites have often been shocked at how little involved many rural and small town people are with the nation. Correspondingly, those same urban elites have often radically misunderstood the local communities and identities constructed by people in the

nation's periphery. When Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa was looking for a metaphor or precedent to understand the enigmatic rural rebellion of the Maoist Shining Path in Peru (Vargas Llosa 1981), he looked at the striking example of a completely misunderstood religious community in rural Brazil in the 1890s whose withdrawal into a mountain stronghold in southern Bahia at Canudos was (mis)interpreted by the national leadership as a monarchist revolt inspired by France, which led them to send several successive armies to level the place, creating one of the classic, enduring narratives of regional versus national identity in Brazil (da Cunha 1973).

NEW GLOBAL LAYERS OF CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION

People around the world also acquire new layers of identity or identification corresponding to new global layers of production and flow of media, enabled by new structural forms of political economy, and new forms and models of media. Forming one of the main new global layers, Hollywood dominated the flow of film to most world markets (Miller 2001) and at least initially dominated the flow of television, as well (Nordenstreng and Varis 1974). So by sheer dint of exposure, American culture began to seem as a familiar second culture to many people (Gitlin 2001), particularly in Western Europe and the Anglophone countries where the U.S. presence was often most notable, but around much of the rest of the world as well (Straubhaar 2007). U.S. exports have also been prominent over the years in satellite/cable TV channels, music, and the Internet. A recent turn in political economy research calls this a new sort of virtual empire by the USA (Hardt and NEGRI 2001). However, many people around the world were more lightly touched by this U.S. layer than others, depending on location, social class, language, religion, and other aspects of identity that led them to discount the U.S. output and choose to watch, read and listen to other things (Hoskins and Mirus 1988).

There are also renewed and expanded transnational layers, based on the roots noted above of cultural-linguistic and geo-cultural levels of production, flow and identity. These utilize the same technologies as does the U.S. media and cultural industries, contributing to the counter to U.S. hegemony potential in what Hardt and Negri call the "multitude" (2004) of those who use the same mechanisms to either oppose the USA or simply develop their own power within their own spheres, like Islamist forces within the Islamic world. Mass media like radio,

cinema and television helped consolidate and renew language and cultural groupings. Since the mid-1990s, research by Sinclair and others (1996) have highlighted the growing importance of cultural linguistic markets. In several cases, new export powers grew up within cultural-linguistic regions originally dominated by others, like the USA within the Anglophone world (Abram 2004) or Brazil within the Lusophone world (Marques de Melo 1988; Cabecinhas 2006). Research on the role of satellite TV in the Arab World (Kraidy 2002) shows how new refinements in media technology can continue to facilitate and reinforce such identities.

In television, the U.S. continues to export heavily, but there are also new layers of other global production and flow or access, such as the worldwide but limited exports of Latin American telenovelas, Japanese anime on film and television, Hong Kong kung fu film and television, and Bollywood films, among others. Brazil alone is estimated to have exported telenovelas to over 140 countries. The scope of these flows, especially compared to Hollywood exports, has been contested (Biltereyst and Meers 2000) but they have grown into visible new options for those who have access to them. Some, such as Japanese anime's popularity in the USA, have grown beyond the contested limits of what were originally called counter-flows (Thussu 2007).

There is also some new global flow of news (with new operations like Al-Jazeera in English), feature films (especially those of Bollywood or those co-produced with Hollywood), music, and some Internet sites, like YouTube, where non-U.S. material is growing rapidly (Cohen and Küpçü, 2006). There are new media forms that are global in ways that we've not yet fully articulated in global media theories, such as the way young people in many countries now interact in talk and text in English via technologies like massive multiple online role playing games like World of Warcraft or virtual worlds like Second Life. These are now becoming so globalized that there were calls in 2009 for research proposals from several U.S. government agencies, which are trying to understand them as a new global form of communication.

GLOBALIZATION AND AUDIENCE CHOICES

It is easy to identify global corporations that are trying to operate in large parts of the world. Groups like Murdoch's have ambitions to own satellite/cable TV channels everywhere. These corporations do powerfully reframe the political economy of how television works almost

everywhere, via ownership, commercial operation models, advertising and programming ideas (Herman and McChesney 1997). For an actual audience member, sitting in Brazil, China or Mozambique, however, it is not always as easy to see much of identification with the actual programming of such global groups. Most people in most places tend to primarily watch locally or nationally produced programs, not those of Hollywood or global producers like Murdoch.

However, while people may be watching programs that are locally produced, that does not mean that they don't have a notable global or regional connection. The mass audience in most places tends to see quite a bit of glocal format programming, globally inspired or even licensed, but nationally or regionally produced (Oren and Shahaf 2010). While global flows of actual programs are very visible, particularly via satellite and cable channels, they just don't attract a majority of the audience in places where local, national or regional material is available. A slightly different case obtains in much of Europe, where production of local or national television programming is on the rise, but U.S. imports are still preferred to those of other European countries (Buonnano 2008). Sparks observed that although CNN seemed to many be an emerging space for a potential global public sphere, the actual audience for CNN International was in fact so small that it could not have a very large direct impact (1998). Audience members in countries large or rich enough to produce quite a bit of programming are probably exposed more to locally produced versions of global genres and formats, such as *Big Brother*, than to direct flows of television in from abroad. For example, Brazilians see very little foreign television programming in prime time, but they are on their fifth localized version of the TV format *Big Brother*, which has been very popular.

THE PROCESS OF HYBRIDIZATION

Let us return to the idea of hybridity as the historical axis of globalization (Nederveen Pieterse, 2002). Contrast that with the rapid spatial expansion of technological and economic changes to regions and countries that are most often considered the essential elements of recent globalization. Hybridity is the adaptation of these forces and changes into the local culture, economy and social system. In some cases, we see genuine hybridity in which substantially new cultures are synthesized out of the elements of previous cultures. In some cases, we see multiple layers formed from substantial parts of the previous different cultures. In many cases, it is both.

Think about the process of hybridization as we have seen it so far. First, there are flows of people, technologies, economic systems, institutional and cultural models, religions, and recently, media, which are connected by core aspects of globalization but also have their own separate dynamics, as Appadurai indicates with his theory of disjunctive scapes of globalization (1990). Pieterse (2003) notes that such flows are normal and have always taken place. However, it seems that in current patterns of globalization, many of these flows are increasing, which leads people to worry about increasing the pace of change. In the most extreme accounts, some think globalization had radically accelerated the pace of change since the 1990s (Friedman 1999).

Second, there are encounters between these flows and the cultures they move into. Flows across borders bring ideas, images, values and practices into new cultures that often have extremely powerful impacts, as in the encounters between indigenous people, European conquerors, and African slaves that radically reshaped all of the Americas. However, Pieterse (2003) also notes that intercultural contact, even heavy contact, such as conquest, colonization, or wholesale religious conversion, is also normal. Cultures are very seldom truly isolated. Contact and change, hybridization, are normal, even inevitable.

Third, there is an interpenetration and interaction of cultures over time. There is a great deal of variety in this. Some few interactions have been controlled to large degree by the policy makers in the receiving culture, like the selectivity that Japan has been able to exercise over the years, including pushing out European traders and missionaries in 1641, and the degree to which it has maintained a continuity of culture, despite ongoing hybridity. In far more situations, the local culture loses official control under colonization but often maintains considerable continuity of culture anyway. In some cases, like large parts of the Americas, indigenous or local cultures are heavily changed, if not virtually destroyed. However, not all encounters with transnational forces are so overwhelming as the colonization of the Americas (Galeano 1988). Many times, outside forces can, in aggregate as well as individual ways, be accepted, rejected or negotiated (Hall 1980). The process of negotiating incorporation and meaning into a new culture can be seen as defining hybridization in each individual case.

Fourth, we would argue that multiple layers of cultural identity form, especially on the receiving side, as new elements and ideas are incorporated. Even when the process seems overwhelming, as in the colonization of the Americas, local cultures often find ways to resist in part and preserve aspects or layers of culture and identity.

Local people learn, often not willingly, new languages, ideas, values, images and religions. For example, both African slaves and indigenous peoples in the Americas were forced to learn and adopt Catholic or, in the north, Protestant Christianity. Black slaves in the United States infused Christianity with their own music and sense of religious participation, making a far more charismatic form of Protestant Christian worship. Black slaves in Brazil and the Caribbean were often able to preserve much more of their own religious practice, mixing it with Catholicism, which emerged as *Voudou* (Haiti), *Santeria* (Cuba), or *Candomblé* (Brazil).

Fifth, there is some genuine mixture of these cultures, which is what many think of as the essence of hybridity. The obvious physical analogy is the mixing of races, which was fairly common in the Americas, and elsewhere. This seemed to go along with mixing of cultures, which was even more pervasive, involving everyone within reach of the colonists. For example, staying with the religious example, a range of syncretic religious practices seem to result from the interaction of European, indigenous and African practices, such as the mixture of Yoruban beliefs in the *Orixás* (deities that represented natural forces, notable ancestors, and human personality characteristics) with beliefs in a variety of Catholic saints, known in Brazil as *candomblé*.

Sixth, many of those who are trying to preserve the continuity of their societies and cultures resist the new forces, ideas and peoples, sometimes by using a layer of imported culture to mask over the continuance of older cultures and identities. In fact, some instances which initially seem like a forced hybridity, such as the mixture of Catholicism with indigenous religions, seem upon further analysis to often represent an attempt at resistance, deliberately maintaining a layer of traditional belief and practice underneath the Catholic elements. One recent statement by a *candomblé* community in Brazil said that veneration of Catholic saints, and syncretization with them, had been, for this community at least, a protective cover which was no longer required, and that the group wanted to return to its African roots as much as possible (Afonjá 1999).

However, complete resistance to outside culture is almost impossible, so both mixture and the maintenance of older layers take place (Pieterse 1995). While some *candomblé* communities want to separate their worship from Catholicism, there are other communities that continue to mix the two or celebrate them in parallel forms. There are several patterns for these forms of mixture: forced, voluntary, and selective.

Almost all cultures absorb powerful flows and restructuring, much of which is currently thought of as global. There are the changes brought on by the rapidly ongoing integration of

most countries and cultures in the world capitalist economy (Wallerstein, 1979) and the more recent information system and technological changes, which accelerate financial flows, bring in new jobs, destroy old jobs, and shift economies toward forms of integration often controlled outside the culture or country (Friedman 1999). This shift in forms and structures tends to commercialize the nature of national and regional media systems, typically emphasizing market-based commercial forms of media and production over others, recasting traditional arts and modes of cultural in these forms. Artisans now adapt to produce modified or hybridized folk art for both national and global tourists (Canclini, 1982) and traditional forms of music get pulled into genres based on rap or rock, as in Brazilian rap and funk music, or their combination of samba and reggae (Perrone and Dunn, 2001).

The global flows of cultural artifacts and people provide models and ideas for these new hybrid forms and added layers of identity. These flows bring in new cultures to add to the existing mixtures and layers. Cultural products come in, and with even broader impact, so do more underlying sets of concepts, like religions, adding new forms and ideas. In nominally Catholic Brazil, the third largest commercial television network broadcaster is a nationally based Brazilian Protestant evangelical church that adapted much of its structure and many of its religious television techniques from U.S. evangelical churches and their style of religious television (Reis 2006). This same church, the Church of the Universal Reign of God, also owns television networks in Guatemala and Mozambique, and seems like to do so elsewhere as well. So while starting as a national group glocalizing North American religious forms into their own, they are now a transnational force taking those glocalized forms to other cultures, where they will be further localized and adapted (Reis 2006).

At the local and sub-national level, as well as for some smaller, more vulnerable nations, all these transnational and global forces can be too much. Vulnerable cultures absorb flows and restructuring, such as the changing structures of global capitalist economy, changing class and labor relations, and changing material bases for local cultural production. Media flow in. Immigrants flow in. Religious and ideological movements flow in. Local languages are often overtaken by outside languages, usually “national” languages. Small language groups can also become vulnerable, losing speakers as younger people end up speaking the languages of larger groups. Every year hundreds of languages simply become extinct as not enough people speak them to maintain them (Wurm 2001). Traditional economies and modes of subsistence are

disrupted by outside forces. So some cultures break under the strain and disappear.

For many of these cultures what happens is not the literal extinction of peoples but their absorption into new, hybrid cultures resulting from mixtures forced from outside. This was typical of the colonial period in Latin America, when indigenous cultures were forcibly absorbed into new hybrid cultures with Spanish and Portuguese conquerors. Similar processes still go on for traditional peoples on the edge of larger more powerful cultures and nations. Conquest, slavery, and forced inter-marriage were, again, perhaps most typical of the Latin American colonization (Galeano, 1985) but go on there and elsewhere, still. Indigenous girls in the Amazon or parts of India are still essentially sold or captured into slavery and prostitution (Dimenstein, 1991). At the most obvious level, what resulted in Latin America and elsewhere is *mestizaje*, the mixture of races (Canclini 1995).

Dominant power usually resides with the outside invader, but not always. In some cases, like Japan, dominant local cultures selectively incorporate the other, outside culture, even when it is forced in militarily. Like the Anglo core of U.S. culture, some dominant local cultures can incorporate cultures from minorities and immigrants. There is selective incorporation of foreign cultures, as Japan has historically absorbed elements from China, Western Europe, and U.S.

HYBRIDIZATION VS. MULTIPLE LAYERS OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Not all cultures are equally vulnerable to outside forces, as we see above. In many, there is a fairly effective resistance to colonialism, historically. Populations survive more or less intact. Local power structures are not completely broken among indigenous and/or imported slaves or workers. Many cultures achieve a great deal of continuity.

While there is nearly always an interpenetration of cultures, that does not mean that increasing homogenization, or even deep synthesis or hybridity takes place. Often it seems that multiple cultural layers form from the interaction of cultures and that multiple layers persist, even as hybridization and mixture take place. Given the seeming ubiquity of hybridization as a process over time (Pieterse 2004), there will be layers of mixture as well.

There is often a superficial hybridity to mask these continuities. For years, outside scholars saw the Afro-Brazilian religion *candomblé* as the classic example of syncretism,

mixing the *orixás* or spirits of Yoruba religion with Catholic saints to produce a new hybrid religion (Bastide 1978). Some in Brazil, however, would argue that many forms of Afro-Brazilian candomblé really represent this kind of multi-layered continuity, as noted above. Overlays of adopted culture can co-exist with an inner core of traditional culture, with the adopted exterior perhaps serving as a mask to conceal the traditional core within.

Cultural elements sometimes survive as layers of culture and identity associated with social classes and groups. They can also survive as identities within individuals and various forms of collectivities.

MULTIPLE IDENTIFICATIONS

In this emerging model, people tend increasingly to identify with multiple cultures at various layers and levels. People can identify with multiple cultural groups, in different fields of activity. There are different identifications people establish at school and work, with family and friends. In this process of learning from others, people form multiple layers of cultural capital, often specific not only to a field of activity as Bourdieu (1984) would predict, but to different sub-cultures or cultural layers. People form different dispositions to behave differently with various groups. Someone can be religious and traditional at home with their parents, adventurous and critical with some friends, sports-minded with others, and achievement oriented with colleagues at work.

So within individuals, multiple cultural capitals coexist, specific to different fields of interaction and activity. Cultural elements survive or even thrive as layers of material practices among social classes, or as identities within individuals and collectivities in these classes. Although Bourdieu tended to see class or group habitus as singular (1984), it seems likely that with these increasingly multiple cultural identities and practices, people may well have multiple habitus for different fields and situations.

All of these different layers of identity, culture and even class habitus will have varied connections to global, cultural linguistic, national, local spaces and forces. While few people will reflect all these layers, I found in interviews that many people were indeed quite multi-layered in both identity and media use. For example, one of the people I interviewed in

Salvador, Bahia in 2004 and again in 2005 had a number of layers of identity corresponding to levels of attention to media and information. He was a former hotel accountant, now working as a taxi driver because it paid better. He paid some attention to global issues via Brazilian television news and newspapers; he knew enough about the war in Iraq to want to make jokes about President Bush, but did not pay that much attention to a broad range of global issues. He was familiar with quite a bit of U.S. popular culture, mostly in music and feature films; the only U.S. television program he could remember was *The Simpsons*. He was somewhat conversant with a few bits of the Lusophone world; he knew about the recent independence of East Timor, he knew some fragments of Portuguese history, but he mostly made jokes about the Portuguese when asked about it. (Many Brazilians tend to tell jokes about the Portuguese very similar to jokes often told in the U.S. about Polish immigrants.) He knew relatively more about Latin America in terms of news and events, knew some songs from other Latin American countries, and sometimes watched Mexican soap operas with his wife, who liked some of them (broadcast on SBT, the second most popular Brazilian network). He spent a lot of time with Brazilian national media, particularly news, talk shows, telenovelas, sports, and music. He was passionate about national and local politics, talking about then current national corruption scandals and giving local examples. He also knew a lot about the music of Northeastern Brazil in general and the music of Bahia in specific. He considered himself an evangelical Christian, but also seemed to know a lot about the Afro-Brazilian religion *candomblé*, and some of the local music groups that used music from it. He considered himself lower middle class, but sympathized a lot with the poor and working class, and talked in terms of class issues quite a bit. He had some college-level training in accountancy, and clearly enjoyed talking with people he considered to be educated, but got along very well, and talked a lot, with fellow taxi drivers with much less education, too. He is clearly of Afro-Brazilian descent and is proud of that in cultural terms, but wary of talking about it in anything related to politics. He liked to talk about Afro-Brazilian music, even in those terms, but was unwilling to talk about other aspects of racial issues, like quotas for racial affirmative action, which were just being implemented in some Brazilian universities. Overall, his education probably permits him a greater level of complexity in terms of identity and media use than most Brazilians, but he is hardly a member of the global elite; he is quite consciously someone struggling to stay in the lower reaches of the middle class. So he is perhaps somewhat typical of what a large number of Brazilians would aspire to be and to do, in terms of identity and media use.

MULTIPLE IDENTIFICATIONS, IDENTITY AND HYBRIDITY

People identify with multiple cultural groups, in various fields of activity and struggle (Bourdieu, 1984). The idea of field is useful since people engage with multiple fields of activity and interest. Even within television, for example, people engage the field of entertainment quite differently than the field of news (Benson and Neveu 2005). In Brazil, for example, I found people inclined to be more critical of television news, since they were aware of its censorship and manipulation, than of telenovelas, even when they were produced by the same broadcaster, TV Globo, the dominant network in Brazil. Many people distinguished what they thought of TV Globo in these two different fields within television.

However, digging deeper in my last two years of interviews in Salvador, a major city in the more Afro-Brazilian part of the Northeast (in 2004-2005), I found that a number of people were turning away from TV Globo's telenovelas, saying that they could not relate to them as well as they could to other kinds of programs on other networks. For example, I found a recurrent phrase, "I don't see people like me on Globo" in interviews in Salvador. That phrase came up in several separate interviews. In an interview in 2004, a working-class Afro-Brazilian taxi driver used that phrase to explain why he was increasingly watching SBT, instead of TV Globo. (SBT, the second rated national network, has had an explicit strategy of targeting lower middle class, working class and working poor viewers across Brazil ever since the 1980s, when its management began to realize that they could not compete across the board for the general audience (Mira, 1990) (Fadul 1993). SBT's advertisements in media professional magazines clearly stressed that audience defined by class, but do not make explicit that that working class and poor audience will be largely Afro-Brazilian, given the strong demographic correlation that exists between class and race in Brazil (Telles and Lim 1998).

I asked the man if he meant that Globo did not have enough Black people on screen and that SBT had more. He said that that was part of it, but wasn't able to elaborate much more; in fact, he seemed uncomfortable talking explicitly about race, as were several others when I asked them what they meant by comments similar to "I don't see people like me on Globo". They had a much easier time talking about how the people on TV Globo were always too rich, not like the people they knew. And they were able to articulate a sense of how Rio, where most of TV Globo's *telenovelas* and other programming is set, was a very different place than Salvador.

I have gone back over what these people in Salvador seemed to mean by this phrase. It seems to entail a varying combination of three layers of identity that emerged in the interviews.

First, people are actively and consciously aware that most of the people portrayed on television, particularly on TV Globo, are much richer than they are. My interviewees openly articulated a sense of class difference with what they saw on television. Second, they are openly aware of the same distance, based in cultural geography, which La Pastina found in more rural parts of the Northeast of Brazil, that those people on screen live in a very different part of the country with a substantially different culture (La Pastina 1999). Third, which only a few articulated openly, those people on screen seemed to be much whiter than viewers in Salvador, where most people are Afro-Brazilian. However, if we accept that in Brazil, racial identity may be largely articulated via regional identity, then what we see is that people are thinking through their own layers of identity in terms of a racialized cultural geography when race itself is too difficult to talk about.

STRUCTURE AND IDENTIFICATION

There is an ongoing, complex interaction between forces of economics and technology, as exemplified by many of the satellite television services, broadcast television networks, and Internet companies or institutions discussed above, and long run patterns of culture and language. To some very large degree, people in audiences come to identify with what they are shown. The extraordinary dominance of global film distribution by the USA since the 1920s has resulted in cultural patterns of familiarity, knowledge and liking for American style films that persists in many parts of the world (Miller 2001). That creates a market defined by both political economy and culture that new networks of feature and documentary film, like HBO or Discovery, can exploit, using new technologies of television distribution. Those supply and reinforce the audiences of those who like those genres. So for large numbers of people, a specific identification with Hollywood style film builds up to where there is a layer of culture so familiar to people that Gitlin called this American cultural layer of production, flow and consumption, a familiar second culture for many people in the world (Gitlin 2001). Buonanno (2008) notes that U.S. television productions are still the second most popular in most European countries, usually after popular local productions, despite the efforts of the European Union to create a geo-cultural regional market for television (Communities 1984).

The creation of a certain linguistic or cultural space or market is intertwined with economic and technological forces. In his work on modern India, Kumar (2006) shows how

Hindi has been both spread and resisted as a national language within India by different institutions of television, at both national and regional levels. By providing ongoing news and culture for people to identify with, a number of these broadcasters, at the level of region or province within India have served to reinforce regional senses of identity, which were already based on earlier forms of language and culture, before television, radio or film.

So the interaction is indeed complex. Audience identification and more aggregated senses of cultural identity change with media forms. Culture is not static. Audience senses of identification can increase as forms of media bring them new and compelling cultural forms to identify with. This is one of the ways that layers of cultural production, flow and identification can increase, reaching the multiple layers presented earlier in this article.

However, ongoing, changing forms of culture (and language) also defines spaces and markets within which use of technologies and orientations of media institutions and businesses is defined. For example, there was a point in the history of television broadcasting in Italy, where somewhat surprisingly large audiences existed for Latin American telenovelas. As channels increased, seeking for new material to program, programmers experimented with the telenovelas and they struck a resonance or identification with parts of the audience to where European scholars began to debate whether counter-flow from the developing to developed nations might be underway (Biltereyst and Meers 2000). However, an underlying preference for locally produced versions of popular television forms could also be seen or anticipated (Straubhaar 1991) and Italian fiction production began to increase, proving profitable, and pushed the telenovelas slowly out of the main parts of the national programming schedule (Buonanno 2004). Still for some parts of the Italian audience, particularly in southern Italy, where many felt more linked with emigration and family ties to countries like Argentina and Brazil, an identification with and liking for such programs continues (Del Negro 2003). These identifications with specific programs again reflect the growth of multiple layers of both identification and identity. These are not essentialized or reified, but must be seen in a steadily changing media and cultural environment where technologies, television institutions, program forms and audience identification and identity evolve together (Iwabuchi 2002).

This ongoing pattern of change can be seen as both hybridity and the multiplication of layers of production, programming/flow, and identification. The hybridity can be seen in

ongoing cultural change through the contact of local, regional, national, transnational and global elements, liked those discussed earlier. Layers of cultural production and identification multiply as technological and economic forces allow. To people I have interviewed in Texas and in Brazil, many of these layers of culture that are made available to them and with which they come to identify, seem very solid, not something they anticipate changing. Latino immigrants to Texas that I have interviewed, as well as Turkish immigrants to western Europe interviewed in research by Ogan (1998), show that many immigrants welcome a certain continuity of culture to be found in television from back home. They cherish that layer of culture and identification, even as they form others in their new environment.

However, these layers of cultural production and flow evolve with technological and economic possibilities. Affordable satellite television channels make it much easier for transnational immigrants to stay more closely involved and identified with their home culture. (Earlier waves of immigrants had fewer media options and were more likely to have to use media in their new hosts countries, if they wanted to use media.) They also evolve with changing, or hybridizing forms of culture, that both reflect and frame the technological and economic possibilities. So as television becomes cheaper, and people also start creating their own cultural forums on websites, we see the growth of Persian language television production in Los Angeles for Iranian immigrants there (Naficy 1993). We see even larger numbers of websites, web radio programs, and even specialized satellite TV channels for South Asian immigrants to the USA or Great Britain, some focused on events back in South Asia, many focused directly on the immigrant experience and news of their own specific community (Mallapragada, 2006). These examples show the reciprocity of economic, technology, culture and media channels. People move in large numbers mostly for economic reasons, although political, familial, religious and other reasons factor in as well (Papastergiadis 2000). As they move, they take their culturally formed interests with them. That creates spaces or markets for new layers of media to act in, if economic and technological possibilities allow. All of these ultimately tend to create a new layer of production, experience and reception, that is media, identification and identity specific to the new immigrant community and its culture. That community and culture will represent both a hybridization of home and host cultures, and a new layer of media and culture in itself.

CONCLUSION

So, to conclude, this article looks at four bodies of issues and theory. First, we see the elaboration and development of new multiple layers of media production, flow, identification and, eventually, identity. People interviewed for this study articulated those multiple layers largely in terms of cultural geography, although class, race and gender were obviously important, but sometimes as articulated with cultural geography, as seems to be the case of race in parts of Brazil. We can usefully think of the process by which these layers accumulate as sedimentary, in which layers pile up over time, like rock layers visible in a cliff face, sometimes maintaining their integrity, sometimes blending with other layers in a process of hybridization.

Second, these layers of identification and identity form in reciprocal interaction between technological possibilities, political-economic forces such as the expansion of global capitalism and technology infrastructure, movement of peoples, expansion of media institutions and companies, and increased spaces for media created by specific, often local actions reflecting the cultural identities and interests of concrete groups of people. We can see these structural forces as articulated with identity as described by Hall (1997). The net effect of this has been the expansion of layers of production and reception of culture at the global, U.S. export empire, transnational cultural-linguistic, transnational geo-cultural, trans-local, national, regional, global city or media capital, metropolitan and local levels. The reception and engagement of these layers of production and flow of media are articulated with the expression of multiple layers of identity as experienced and articulated by the people interviewed. Indeed we would argue that layers of identity are structured both from above by political-economic and technological forces and from below by cultural forces articulated with the large forces from above and by choices and actions taken from below by individuals and groups as they exercise their agency in the creation of cultural geography, as anticipated by de Certeau (1984).

Third, instead of the homogenization feared by earlier theorists (Hamelink 1983), we see a less drastic but perhaps equally pervasive hybridization of cultures (Kraidy 2005). Both media institution professionals and audience members I have interviewed tend to articulate what they see as the increase in the number of layers or kinds of culture (often expressed as new markets by the professionals), but those layers are also slowly changing as they also interact and hybridize over time.

So, fourth, this is also a complex and dynamic system that is constantly evolving or emerging (Straubhaar 2007), as culture, political-economy, and technological possibilities interact and shape each other and the multiple layers of identity articulated and expressed by people interviewed for this study.

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