Communication as southern epistemology: from recognition to the emergence of the event*

Comunicação como epistemologia do sul: do reconhecimento à emergência do acontecimento

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ABSTRACT

We seek to foreground the communication as a tensive field established from the struggle for recognition, which may lead to the event. We will start from the necessity for this communication theory to stand as materialistic and tread the path that led Honneth to criticize Habermas, indicating that the theory of communicative action does not consider the conflict, resulting in a sociological deficit. As a result, we will think about a southern epistemology in which critique can be examined from a situation of disrespect, or the necessary construction of identity of the colonized, despite the visibility regime available. The event involves the change of visibility circuit from which the subjects of communication constitute themselves.

Keywords: Struggle for recognition, event theory, critical theory of communication, Alain Badiou, Axel Honneth

RESUMO

Busca-se tematizar a comunicação como um campo tensivo estabelecido a partir de lutas pelo reconhecimento, podendo conduzir ao acontecimento. Partiremos da necessidade da teoria da comunicação em se mostrar materialista e continuaremos pelo que levou Honneth a criticar Habermas, indicando que a teoria da ação comunicativa não considera o conflito, resultando num déficit sociológico. Em seguida pensaremos em uma epistemologia do sul na qual a crítica possa ser erigida a partir de situação de desrespeito ou de necessária construção de identidade do colonizado, a despeito dos regimes de visibilidade disponíveis. O acontecimento implica a mudança do circuito de visibilidade a partir do qual os sujeitos da comunicação se constituem.

Palavras-chave: Luta pelo reconhecimento, teoria do acontecimento, teoria crítica da comunicação, Alain Badiou, Axel Honneth

T HIS TEXT AIMS to think communication against media devices that favor the construction of "selves" entrepreneurs of themselves in a visibility regime that imagines and idealizes gated community life. The manager-communication speaker proposes managing regulations rather than a policy, thus operating coloniality and producing subjects by identification, subjects that guide their lives by conducting a utilitary optimization of actions: I invest my money on what capitalizes me, on what will turn my children into rational capitalizers, owners of goods and tangible and intangible attributes (aiming the pursuit of success in this entrepreneur logic). Alternatively, Safatle has been proposing us to think a policy as a circuit of affections different from capitalization, a policy thought by an *aesthesis* anchored in other affections and in a diverse sensitive relationship with the bodies.

We will follow four main steps: a) First of all, such theory must be thought as materialistic (we will explain in which sense we understand this concept here); b) Secondly, communication is not consensual, because it is part of a discrepancy, i.e., it is thought as a *tensive field* of basic antagonism; it will come as a critic of Habermas' theory of communicative action assumptions and the contrasting ideas developed by Axel Honneth, who proposes a theory of recognition; c) To think this communication theory as a tensive field that will lead us to contemplate the emergence of other sensitive circuits of affections by using a theory of the event and thinking recognition in the relationship with the emergence of disruptive events; d) Such theory is theme of the issue of visibility and invisibility that reallocates the "current figure of man" (Safatle, 2012), the utilitarian consumer, leading us to ignore postmodern theories that come from the North in favor of a Southern epistemology.

THE MATERIALIST CONCEPT OF COMMUNICATION

What is a materialistic concept of communication? In the book *Absolute recoil*, Žižek (2014) differentiates the usual concept of materialism from a more structural concept linked to the theory of language. In traditional Marxism, materialism means that ideology (understood as an ideal inverted mirror of reality) relies on the process of extra ideological material of social reproduction, not considering the Althusserian dimension of the material existence ideology in the State's ideological devices, comprising a network of institutional practices and rituals. According to Lacan, it is possible to consider another materiality,

one specific for ideas inherent to an "ideal" symbolic order as this order can not be reduced to meaning expressions, working as a machine with no meaning, a machine that is the Great Other before any materialization in institutions or material practices. (Žižek, 2014: loc. 1122[1]).

In other words, materiality not only means that ideas are founded in the social material process, but also that they have their own materiality; ideas are inscriptions that produce marks in the world. The difficulty of employing an ideal state of things (a moral universe, for example) from the existing gap between the purity of the ideal and the impurity of empirical world's difficulties (it is actually settled at the very core of the language, i.e., in the language center there is a moat, a fan, a primary damage that moves symbolic marks). According to Žižek (2014), "a distortion inherent to language" that manifests itself in a movement of engendering a false appearance that "is not from the order of empirical corruption of a original normativity" (loc. 1149). Žižek says:

> Here, the communicative reason of Habermas is emblematic: the communicative action is possible given by the human capacity for rationality, but this rationality is not more of traditional type, neither the structure of the immanent rational cosmos (as in Aristotelian tradition) nor the rational *a priori* of the Kantian transcendental subject. Aware of the fact that today such philosophical foundationalism is no longer possible, Habermas conceives rationality as an inherent capacity of language, especially in the form of arguments. Thus, he reinterprets the transcendental horizon as an *a priori* pragmatic intersubjective speech: all speech act objectively aims the mutual understanding and human beings possess the communicative competence to achieve understanding. Argumentative speech is based on an inherent normativity – the absence of coercion, the mutual search for understanding, the power of the best argument – that makes communication possible. This way, Habermas strives to support human emancipation goals and to maintain an universal ethical framework: the normativity that he talks about is not an external ideal, but it is immanent to our participation in linguistic intersubjectivity – when we talk to others, this implies that we obey those standards even if we consciously violate them. Being *a priori* inherent to language, this pragmatic is irredutible: no one can approach it in a strict transcendental sense. [...] For Habermas, all the other uses of language (lying, tricking, seducing, etc.) are derivatives: secondary distortions of the inherent normativity, submitted by relations of power and domination or by the search for private interests (2014: loc. 1122).

1. We use here the kindle edition of the book (hence the loc reference given by the device).

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However, for a tradition more connected to psychoanalysis and structuralism, there is an entire field where parasites flourish, according to the words of Derrida (1991), comprising Freudian slips, lies, frauds, and pretenses that are the source of the language itself, inscribed in its own structure, not only secondary distortions of its immanent normativity. Impurity is not an empirical flaw, but *a priori*, a transcendent one. Žižek approaches these distortions, these *torts*, from the performative dimension of socio-symbolic interactions, from the set of social roles, of submission to the civilized rules of politeness in which a causality of non-empirical facts, but of superficially polished illusions of mere pretending, starts to be played; the severity level in honest lies and the maintenance of appearances is called by Lacan as "the great Other". This politeness is more than submission to an external legality and less than a purely moral activity – it is an ambiguous and inaccurate domain concerning what we are not strictly obliged to do, but what is expected from us to do. It is about unspoken and implicit regulations, linked to questions of tact and to the fact that the speaker has a non-reflective relation, which is part of our spontaneous sensitivity, a dense texture of habits and expectations that constitute an inherited substance.

Such direction takes out from the center of the language a certain conception of transparency, of maximum expressibility, of understanding as the *telos*, of subsumpting that we all know how the normal use of language is like, that we are able to think in a context of speech present yourself. Derrida (1991), for example, arguing against this communicational metaphysics, proposed the inversion of the metaphysics traditional habit of putting writing under the umbrella of communication, i.e., writing would not be a stretched communication, operating when communicants are far from each other because of the distance or time lag. Thus, the writable mark that scratches the world, whether in oral or written communication, would no longer be thought of as an ontological modification of presence. If before writing was long distance communication, for Derrida, to communicate is one of writing species, an effect of the writing, of inscription. One does not only communicates in the presence of a speaker. Once the mark is produced, it generates new contexts in subsequent times, even in the absence of an destinator. That is the reason why we can decipher a code of a lost civilization.

COMMUNICATION AS A TENSIVE FIELD

By following this line of thought, communication is not a mean of transporting something we want to say, something that moves around a channel

by joining two consciousnesses, one of these being the speaker and the other being the receptor-receptive. Once the mark is put in circulation, it generates new contexts and produces plural communications. For Derrida (1991), every mark is a grapheme, a scratch of our world, i.e., it is what the author calls a "not present restance" (Ibid.: 28). Thus, there is no experience of pure presence, only differential chain marks. Such critic was made to think about the metaphysical assumptions of Austin and Searle's theory of speech acts, whose center is full in meaning (normal speech act) that helps us to examine the Habermas' theory of communicative actions.

The interest by the concept of performative introduced by Austin and supported by the theory of Habermas concerns the expansion of language actions before limited to the *perception* of the states of things of the world, and to a semantic that says if the thing is appropriate to its name. If I say the guard has killed the activist, I will have to prove it in the court of law to obtain the conviction: the truth as correspondence and awareness is the center of language activity in this model. With Austin (1962), the language assumes the activity of doing things in the world: by promising something, we enunciate a sentence that, after said, is already promised. Talking is doing. Why is this of Habermas' theory interest? Because Habermas criticizes the widespread way of using language, which is instrumental, based on the constative mode of discourse, widespread in the systemic world (of war, of economy, of parties), where the truth is the correspondence between the description of the state of things (and of such state itself) because of what the philosopher calls the *colonization* of the world of life by the system: culture turns into merchandise, everything else turns into another goal to be achieved by following comparable strategies and alternatives. The difference of attitude between one case and another is given as follows: while in the systemic mode the actant builds goals and choose comparable alternatives to achieve them, what counts in the communicative mode of the lifeworld and of culture is the pursuit for understanding how to solve situations in which the agents are involved. For us is not enough to observe and estimate, it is necessary to develop the language to consider its symbolic force, which is decreased, reduced, and impoverished in the systemic mode.

In the Habermas' communicative mode, language is the ultimate mean of communication, having not only a semantic function, but also a pragmatic one. The pragmatic function is that one in which the actants' action is given *in a situation*. Corresponding to the adjustment interaction scheme in Landowski (2014: 47). If I check by the window that it is raining outside and I can say that the sentence *it is raining outside now* is true, the criterion is semantic and

language is constative. On the other hand, if a couple wants to break up and they are trying to reach an agreement to divide the assets and their children's custody, it is not about a constative language, but a communicative one. Pragmatics refers to this use of language in concrete situations of the everyday life, in the search for an understanding via contingent communication by considering concrete data from the situation currently happening. According to Landowski:

> During adjustment processes, the way an actor influences another one takes very different paths: no more by the communication of autonomous objects (messages, simulacra, modal values, or value-objects) that perform the function of persuasive or dissuasive speeches within a logic of "junction", but by the "contagious" *contact*, implying a problem in the union. […] Now we are dealing with an interaction between equals, in which the parties coordinate their dynamics by means of a set of actions. Thus, allowing them to adjust one to another is a new capacity, or at least a particular competence that the previous model [the programmation regime] had not the chance to know: the ability of feeling themselves mutually. To differentiate this from the modal competence, we named it aesthetic competence (2014: 50).

In Landowski we have this pragmatic functioning (by taking this further than Habermans did before), since the author operates with the sensitive aspects of the communicative relationship, which he calls *aesthetics*. What is of our interest here is to mark the difference between the regimes of programmation, manipulation, and adjustment, which is what best fits the Habermas' communicative concept, with emphasis on the sensitive questions, besides the one of intelligible communication.

The problem in Habermas' theory is twofold: on one hand it creates a gap between an instrumental rationality (systemic) and a communicative rationality, while on the other hand it thinks the communicative action from a language purpose (*telos*) as a normality center from which we can think about deviations and pathologies. In the center of Habermas' language, there is a full Other that speaks for understanding and expressivity (Prado, 2014; Habermas, 2012).

Against this view, Derrida (1991) supports a theory of language linked to psychoanalysis, placing a gap at the center of language, like a parasite, a vacuum around which marks gravitate. According to Freud, we could say that at the center of the language there is the Freudian slip, a *tort* (Rancière, 1996), a kind of transmission of the great parasite of the unconscious. Instead of abolishing and excommunicating the spectral appearances of the unconscious,

leaving at the idealized center of language a fullness, the One, there is a need for them to think about the impure and devious language as transmissions in multiple, regular, and plural cases. Instead of idealizing a full communication from Searl's expressibility principle – everything that can be thought can be expressed (Searle, 1970) – we need to consider Lacan's idea of sexual difference (Žižek, 2013: 427).

In his introduction to the book *The Struggle for Recognition* by Axel Honneth, Marcos Nobre points out that Honneth (2003) tries to promote a reflection on the proposal of Habermas, constructed within critical theory, stating that the theory of communicative actions does not consider the *centrality of the conflict*. As Honneth (2011) states, by putting communicative actions as a critical paradigm, Habermas took a step toward the reformulation of social criticism and toward a way out from the Adornian negativity, centered in the idea of culture colonization (lifeworld) by the systems, in which there is a rationality with purposes, of strategic type, such as the one that dominates the economy.

The question the author does to Honneth is: "which phenomena in the theory of communicative action take the role of witnessing day-by-day the critical compliance before any scientific reflection?" (Honneth, 2011: 134). The problem is that both in Adorno and Habermas the focus is "on the contemporary diagnosis that the self-nomination of systemic powers can currently cause the dissolution of the society's social nucleus" (Ibid.: 133). However, Habermas considers the positive potential of the experiences of communicative agents in their daily life as they attempt to solve problematic situations with other agents, "within a horizon of normative expectations, whose disappointment can always be convert back into a source of moral requirements that point out to the beyond established ways of power" (loc. cit.). What does Honneth is searching for? For him, critical theory must be able to nominate

the experiences and empirical attitudes that pre-scientifically indicate their normative point of views are indeed supported by reality. […] Which general phenomena, in the Habermas' theory, take the role of witnessing day-by-day the critical compliance before any scientific reflection? My suspicion is that at this point a chasm is opened in the theory of communicative action that does not come from a casual origin, actually being of systematic nature (Ibid.: 134).

The process of emancipation upon which Habermas builds his critical theory does not reflect in the moral experiences of the subjects involved

(Ibid.: 135), since they understand their losses as lesions in their identity pretensions and not as limitations linguistic rules. For Honneth, motivations for social protest behaviors in the society's poorest strata "are not based on orientations by positively founded moral principles, but by the experience of violation of intuitively given ideas of justice" (Honneth, 2011: 137). *They search for social recognition, and fight against social disregard inside of a tensive field.*

It is this direction that Honneth follows to solve sociological deficits in the Habermas' communication theory, based on a universal pragmatics. The starting point of this turn is considering "regulatory conditions of social interaction cannot be understood in this extent if only based on free of coercion linguistic understanding conditions" (loc. cit.). With that, Honneth expands the paradigm of communication beyond linguistic theories. The lack of recognition is always accompanied by experiences of loss of personality when the communicative agent lives the experience of feeling disregarded, i.e., feeling shame, anger or indignation. For Honneth, there is a

> close relation between the violations that affected the normative assumptions of social interaction and the moral experiences the subjects have in their daily communication: if such conditions faded, denying a person the deserved recognition, then the affected one would react in response to this by experiencing moral feelings of disregard, such as shame, anger, or indignation. Thus, the communication paradigm understood in the terms of the theory of recognition can finally fill the theoretical gap that Habermas has left opened when he was developing the Horkheimer program: those feelings of injustice that usually come along structural forms of disregard represent a pre-scientific social fact, through which a critic of the relations of recognition may show its own theoretic perspective. (2011: 138)

Thus, Honneth undertakes the tension between the system and the life-world, lying on the experiences of suffering experienced as disregard, i.e., "social causes that are responsible for the systematic violation of the conditions of recognition" (loc. cit.).

WHAT SUBJECT? PATH OF EVENT RECOGNITION

Safatle (2012) resumes the theory of recognition in his book *Grande hotel abismo*, in which he investigates a subject that does not depend on the egologic reduction of the current figure of man that features the Self S/A,

that is, of the actor that searches, in the heart of the globalized society of consumption the essence of the Self. Usually, psychological distress occurs when individuals fail the process of individualisation, consequently, they start feeling like they are not capable of guiding themselves in the social world (Safatle, 2012: 6). Safatle emphasizes that people also suffer for "being very attached to the entification of the individual's identification structure" (loc. cit.), i.e., we suffer for being this I, because we search for this I. This is given in terms of inability of living

> experiences of non-identity and indetermination (which simply leads to the inability of living experiences as *events*), or even the isolation of those who find no more traits of others in their own temporal experience (loss of historicity) and the compulsive association to the current figure of men (loc. cit.).

Safatle's (2012) search leads us to think in communication considered as very different from the model of Habermas, who thinks the *Lebenswelt* (the culture) as a background that guarantees new horizons. It is about rethinking, according to Safatle, what we understand for rational actions from Adorno and Lacan. Safatle proposes us to think the subject not as a substancial identity that founds self-determination processes (a type of full and spherical subject in the search for success in celebrative actions) to "transform itself into the *locus of non-identity and of splitting*" (Ibid.: 12). This non-identity is presented as "a non-recoverable negativity for the structuring of a subjectivity that does not get lost in the middle of the universal language" (Ibid.: 13).

There is a determination suffering from social models of a regime of visibility that convenes actants to build themselves as subjects of the construction of the essence of the Self (Freire Filho, 2010; Prado, 2013a), which Safatle calls "the current figure of man". For him, "the compulsive association to such current figure is exactly which is named as "the egologic reduction of the subject', the impossibility of thinking that, within the experience, is not submitted to the shape of the Self" (Ibid.: 315).

In Dunker (2015), this project of the I S/A is already settled in gated communities such as Alphaville, in São Paulo: "a region isolated from the rest [...], an artificial neighborhood, formed by a series of interconnected gated communities, with a commercial and business center, in an area before occupied by squatters" (Ibid.: 48). The great appeal for upper-middle classes concerns security, the access to services, and the "promise of a racially integrated community" (Ibid.: 49). Well, the psychoanalysis

teaches us to recognize these social productions that excel in a region of guarded extra-territoriality, a sheltered space where people can find the pleasure of freedom (Dunker, 2015: 53).

What do we see inside a gated community? Dunker says:

A strongly bounded place (walls) where representations are replaced by the functional management (the manager) that creates its own rigid law (regulations), giving moral identity to its inhabitants. People that live inside it have substantial ideals of fulfillment and success. Therefore, gated communities are usually acquired by extensive debts, compromising the subjects to a future commitment and introducing a large physical distance between them and their families or neighborhoods of origin (2015: 58).

Considering the previously exposed logic, what happens with the feelings of discomfort and suffering? A gated community is a type of social bond where one part of the population is within its walls and the other is on the outside, comprising historically constituted sets of discomfort, suffering, and other symptoms. We can look at this more closely:

We must remember that the concept of gated community is inversely associated to favelas. The synthetic joint of these two opposite universes is, naturally, the prison. This logic of concentrating people behind walls carries a state of exception, alternating between the *liberal side* of the walls (that contributes to the establishment of regulation devices), and its *disciplinary side* (that contributes by controlling the excesses). Besides these two there is also the *romantic side* of gated community, by which the structure shows itself as something idealized. That is, gated communities are determined by three complementary meanings, such as the good use of freedom, as well as the maintenance of order and the idealization of experience, that together comprise the narcissistic fantasy of the walls (Ibid.: 68).

It is not about helping the poor ones anymore, as Dunker says, it is about "locating and containing this residue as structural globalized poverty" (loc. cit.). Social problems must stay on the outside of the walls, creating barriers between people.

According to Dunker "all suffering is a thought that did not find its turning point, the wish of seeing things differently". With that, we have a loss of experience and a block: "that is expressed as the inability of building, trans-

mitting or generalizing experiences" (loc. cit.). Suffering can be overly named (codified in legal, moral or clinical forms) or poorly named (diffuse discomfort, floating anxiety). We not only suffer with the excess of unproductive experiences of determination, caused by disciplinary institutions and institutionalized speeches; we also suffer with the deficit of productive experiences of indetermination that are necessary to ensure "freedom be expressed in real acts and not just in indirect recognition with the submission and mediation of symbolic systems united by the utopian or theological-political administered unit" (loc. cit.). We have already seen this in Safatle, when he talks about the importance of experiences of non-identity. For Dunker, the importance lies on the idea that not every indetermination means the denial of a previous determination.

There are experiences of indetermination that are productive. Therefore, the subject does not only suffer with the systemic excess of determination, by living under the regulations of the manager of the gated community, but also with the lack of productive experiences of indetermination. That is exactly what has not been considered in theories on Brazilianness. According to Safatle: "Such productive experience can be properly thought when we are capable of abandoning the illusion the pre-philosophical language of the common sense no longer brings in its core the anthropological figure of the man we should get used to" (Safatle, 2012: 314). Under this perspective, the theory of communication should not think communication as a full ideal of expressibility, but as a tensive field that goes around the parasite Derrida talks about, in which an event may arise politics, changes, i.e., world's transformation from a effective discontinuity, a singularity defined as "being whose thoughts can not be reduced to the mundane context" (Badiou, 2008: 395). It is in this direction we should rethink the theory of communication. I believe that there are Brazilian authors who follow this direction, especially those working with the theory of the event in its various approaches (pragmatic, with Vera França, Deleuzian, with Ciro Marcondes, among others).

We must see this experience of suffering from determination alongside the experiences of agents who seek recognition within social antagonism, in which voices that have no space in social sharing demand space in the social field. To take this into account implies considering negativity and the value of its expressions (the difference between our authors and the Deleuzian ones). There is a certain infinity potency in this suffering of indetermination that biopolitics and media want to curse by diagnosing every symptom that may indicate a passion that disables the actant-of-the-essence-of-the-Self. According to the psychoanalysis,

we cannot just suffer for being unable to build us as individuals in the sense of not achieving success in social and individual processes. We may suffer only for being an individual (Safatle, 2012: 316).

Inspired by Adorno and Lacan, as we have seen, Safatle wants to build a theory of the subject that is "free from the bonds of thought and identity and of an anthropology founded in normativity that define humanity of the man" (loc. cit.). The theory of communication considers its critical instance from a theory of recognition whose experiences come from the suffering (of determination and indetermination), also having to avoid humanist questions connected with the idea of identity and with the biopolitic figure of the healthy and successful subject. Thus, the theory of communication that considers this figure of the subject beyond the current figure of man should also think within decoloniality.

RECOGNITION AND VISIBILITY

This type of social theory imagined by Safatle considered the concept of social emancipation, despite not being put into modern terms, because, as Santos (2007:18) says: "instruments that regulated the discrepancy between reform and revolution, experiences and expectations, regulation and emancipation, these modern forms are currently in crisis." In addition, theories that came from the North, of Eurocentric root, are also not satisfactory, considering we are pushed towards globalization, because such theories can not be applied here. In our social reality, as said by Amálio Pinheiro (2013), there is no linear and progressive concept of succession, but the non-orthogonal activity of baroque present in decorations. The non-consideration of such differences leads to the waste of experience. Santos (2007: 24) states the following: "Local experiences, not-well known or recognized by the hegemonic social sciences, are harassed by the media, and because of that have remained invisible and without credit".

Visibility regimes create ways of seeing and being seen in which a certain amount of people feel invisible and unnoticed when living on the outside of the gated community. According to Souza, the liberal generalization

imagines a society composed of a set of interchangeable and replaceable *homo economicus* with the same habits and discipline capabilities, self-control, and self-responsibility, which would be found in all classes. (2006: 10)

By following this idea, outcasts "are perceived as someone with the same potential of a middle-class individual" (Souza, 2006: 10), considering that, by chance or lack of competence, these outcasts not climbed the social scale, not making themselves visible with a strong and full of communicative competence Self, "their situation being easily reversible with a little help from the State until the point they could walk with their own legs" (loc. cit.). For Souza,

Various concepts that imagine the subordinate integration is reversible by an act of will or as if it was magic are not very different from that. In the same way, the various forms of "glorifying the oppressed" occur in social sciences of all ideologies that bring water to the mill of self-indulgence, passivity and of the maintenance of the *status quo* bias. These ideologies are unaware of the fact that the reproduction of marginalized classes involve the production and reproduction of moral, cultural, and political preconditions of marginality. They are unaware that the misery of these outcasts is directly produced not only in the form of economic misery, but also in emotional, existential, and political misery (loc. cit.).

How can we break this vicious cycle? Souza refuses to glorify the oppressed or to uncritically accept the politically correct. There is a need to "rebuild the lost bond between the modernization pattern, the opaque and impersonal domination, formation of 'pre-reflexive' consensus, and the naturalization of inequality" (loc. cit.). Souza proposes an alternative theory of social action that is applicable to the context of the Brazilian peripheral modernity. Our critical theory of communication should also consider this positioning, since it is not about making a mere description "of the immediate reality in the narrative reproduction of subjective states of humiliation and discomfort" (as in Luis Educardo Soares, criticized by Souza):

A new social theory requires the conceptual construction of a theory of social action that explains why people, especially a determined class of people, feel humiliation and discomfort in their everyday experience (Souza, 2006: 11).

The alternative social theory proposed by Souza goes against the emotional theory of action created by Gilberto Freire and developed by Sérgio Buarque, explaining the culture of privilege and the Brazilian inequality "from the differential access to the share capital of personal relationships" (Ibid.: 13). This emotional theory sees the Brazilian as a friendly man mainly guided by rational calculations, "creating a world divided between friends and enemies"

(loc. cit.). This theory of action is part of the dominant social imagination, and would have been created in opposition to the theory of instrumental action that is prevalent in the North. This emotional theory culturally associates a positive identity to Brazilians, being hard to be opposed and putting forward an "unrealistic compensation":

> from it, individuals of these societies, perceived as pre-modern precisely because of the emphasis on emotions and feelings compared to rational calculations, can understand themselves as more "warm", more "human", more "welcoming", and even more "sensual" than individuals of cold and insensitive advanced societies. It was because of this "substitutionary satisfaction" that the "unrealistic compensation" became the basis of the internal solidarity of Brazilian societies (Souza, 2006: 14).

The image of this emotional integration creates a national identity to the friendly Brazilian from the perspective of a myth. Differences between Brazilians in this image comprise notions of income and lifestyle (counterpart of the division established by the gated community social bond): "because of that the economic progress among us is perceived as a panacea to solve problems such as inequality, marginalization, and incomplete sense of citizenship" (Ibid.: 14).

To think in a critical theory of communication under the South's perspective of epistemology, as seen in Santos (2010), we must start from the idea of antagonism and theory of language that considers the parasite, the Freudian slip. In addition, Honneth's theory of recognition must undergo a transformation, because it will be criticized regarding humanistic anthropology from the point of view of psychoanalysis (Dunker, 2015).

The South's critical theory of communication (not the geographical South, but the postcolonial one) must think about the issue of communication by searching for real people in suffer that are following the path to recognition, and must rethink the social bond in a different manner than that concerning the gated community life. This must not be thought from humanism, since it is not about thinking recognition demands as only guided by "the pressure for the universalization of positive rights that determine the universality of the legal person" (Safatle, 2012: 11). As we have seen, contemporary societies "are driven by recognition demands for productive experiences of indetermination and negativity" (loc. cit.). Safatle's idea is that it is not necessary to think about institutions that consolidate disciplinary structures "aiming to produce strong individuals from the point of view of identity" (loc. cit.), nor to produce individuals of flexible identities "able to stabilize situations of social anomie,

identities fascinated by the perverse logic of the infinite bad game between affirmation and transgression of the law" (Safatle, 2012: 12). From the (des) identical, we criticize the current rules of the identity character effect that are linked to the promotion of the Self. "However, rather than simply imposing a new and more inclusive rule, there is a opening to something that is not offered under the figure of the rule, but of the event" (Safatle, 2012: 12). In the terms of Dunker (2015), we have to appeal to the Amerindian thought to confront the Western reason (North), by incorporating the experiences of indetermination beyond to Honneth – the meeting in the woods that Viveiros de Castro tells us about –, bringing Hegel for an sandwich internship in the Amazon, where he will read a Brazilian Lacan.

He also approaches the theory of the event (Prado, 2013b) to give us clues on how to think changes as an esthesic and political discontinuity. That is because Marcondes Filho (2010) aims to think its theory of communication against the hegemonic view of communication in the globalized capitalist society, understanding it as eventual, according to Deleuze. To overcome this communication is a way of producing coloniality and intersubjectivity, formalizing the ways of producing knowledge to satisfy the needs of capitalism. To think about the theory of communication as a critic emerged from the event includes imagining it as a rupture, an eruption, or as an output from the world of systemic or gate community management, from a world that promotes self-entrepreneurship of a Self that wants to achieve success, as a disproportionate experience in terms of intensity, whose energies sprout of productive experiences of indetermination: "such productive experience can only be properly thought when we are capable of abandoning the illusion that the pre-phylosophical language of the common sense no longer brings in its core the anthropological figure of man we should get used to" (Safatle, 2012: 313). Therefore, as we have seen, it is about criticizing the egologic reduction of the subject, i.e., the "inability of thinking about something that, within the experience, is not submitted to the Self" (Ibid.: 315).

To think communication by considering the event is to take into account the "potency of indetermination that seems to live in every subject is the first manifestation of an experience of infinity" (Safatle, 2012). To Badiou, the event is the cut of what an object of the world is going to become for its self-emergence and "the supplementation of appearances by the advent of a footprint: the old tornado of intense existence" (2008: 46). In the event we have the eruption of an "evanescent separator", i.e., "a timeless moment that separates the previous state of an object from its following state" (loc. cit.). The events break the order of state of things in politics, science, arts, or love,

and extracts "from a time the possibility of another time" (Badiou, 2008: 427). One of the effects of the event is the emergence of an active and appropriate body to the new gift that just appeared: "the actions and passions of the multiples are not the ones that [...] are synthesized in the event. It is the appearance of the event that magnetizes all multiples, constituting them in a subjectable body" (Badiou, 2008: 427). Events have a great intensity regarding the sensitive of the bodies. If we had subjects to give continuity to the process of truth opened by the intensity of the event, we could say that they are faithful subjects of the event. **M**

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